The paramilitarization of power
Javier
Giraldo,
a quietly spoken Jesuit priest who is also prominent member of the Justice
and Peace Commission in Colombia, reveals how an internal armed conflict
has been turned into an exercise in international private enterprise.
He spoke with NI's David
Ransom.
What has been the impact
of the 'War on Terror' in Colombia?
There has been military intervention in
Colombia by the United States for a very long time. Since 1998 it has been
even more explicit in the form of the 'Plan Colombia' – a plan to spend
$1.3 billion for specific military programmes, legitimized by the 'war on
drugs'. They padded it out a bit with social plans, which they wanted to
sell to the European Community, linking this to the Plan Colombia. The US
would finance the military part, the EU the social part. Fortunately, the
majority of EU countries didn't want to collaborate with military intervention.
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When President Uribe took office in 2002 he got agreement that funds for
the war against drugs could also be used for the war against the guerrillas.
So the Plan Colombia became a direct intervention in an internal conflict.
Bit by bit the funds for the war against drugs were redirected to the war
against the insurgents.
The language of terrorism dominated Uribe's statements.
He seemed to consider himself practically an envoy sent from God to combat
terrorism. It was a very similar discourse to that of Bush. It went so far
as to deny that there is a political conflict in Colombia – an internal armed conflict, that
is. Uribe said many times that there was no armed conflict in Colombia – the
only thing that existed was a society defending itself from terrorism. Even
some of his allies said this was an unacceptable exaggeration.
In 2003 the guerrillas kidnapped three members of a private US military business
which was deploying helicopters. The US Army sent many soldiers from the
US to look for them. It was like a military invasion. The only people who
protested publicly were an association of retired military men. They signed
a petition to the Council of State saying that the Constitution was being
violated. The President has an obligation, before foreign troops enter the
country, to consult with the Council of State. Uribe had not done so. Although
some comments were made in the press, Congress did nothing – didn't
even discuss it.
When President Uribe took power, the language of terrorism dominated his statements. He seemed to consider himself practically an envoy sent from God to combat terrorism.
The US Congress recently approved another proposal from
Bush to double the US presence in Colombia. Until now we've had 400 military
advisers from the US; soon we'll have 800. The most dangerous are not, however,
the official military advisers. At the same time a quota was approved for
private military contractors, which I call the 'international paramilitaries'.
Most of them have retired from the armed forces of the US and set up private
military businesses. They have enormous contracts with the US Department
of Defence. Currently, according to the New York Times, the cost of all
these contracts is $3.1 billion – almost equivalent to the entire cost of the Colombian
Army. In October 2002 another New York Times article – which was reprinted
in Colombia – talked of the 'profits of war', the 'profitable face
of war'. These people are international mercenaries, not accountable even
to a military court if they commit crimes.
In Colombia they have committed many crimes. For example, in 1998 there was
a massacre in Santo Domingo, Arauca, in which 17 peasants were killed and
25 wounded. Among the dead there were seven children. They were killed by
cluster bombs, dropped on their small peasant village. The first account
from the military was that the guerrillas were using an old truck in the
centre of the village, which exploded. That was untrue. All the testimonies
were that the bombs had been dropped by a helicopter. Bit by bit it was proved
that the people who gave the orders to drop the bombs were two American pilots
in a helicopter that was supposedly 'monitoring' a military operation. The
pilots were from one of the private military businesses that was being employed
by a multinational oil corporation called Occidental.
It has proved impossible to take any legal action against those pilots because
they were private contractors. The US Embassy says it can do nothing because
these people were not agents of the US state. This is the same kind of private
military presence as there was in Bosnia and Croatia. The Vice-president
of the US himself has big investments in one of these companies.
That's one military aspect of the Uribe Government. Another is the increase
in internal military forces. Since Uribe took office the numbers in the
official armed forces have been increased by more or less 100,000. What
is really happening, however, is the 'paramilitarization' of the country.
When he was a Presidential candidate, in Antiochia, Uribe's basic programme
was to link the civilian population with the armed forces. As soon as he
won the presidency, the following day, he went to the Atlantic coast – where the military
has the most sway – and symbolically inaugurated his proposed 'network
of informers' with 100 young men, 'consecrated' them as army informers
in a much-publicized ceremony.
This network of 'co-operators' is a monstrous project. A few days ago we
had a meeting with the Vice-minister of Defence in Bogotá. I didn't
know this before, but he told me in the meeting that he was the co-ordinator
of the 'co-operators' network project'. He gave me a copy of a document
which said that during the four years of the Uribe Government five million
Colombians have been link to the network.
Paramilitarization has resulted in a military, political and economic force which even the politicians cannot control.
It's not just these 'networks', either. They've created
a model for what they call 'peasant soldiers'. These are young men in rural
areas who are taken away for just three months of military training. They
return to their own community with weapons, linking them to the local conflict,
to their own community. This is a violation of even the most minimal independence
that the armed forces of any state should have. It's at the other extreme – absolute
partiality.
President Uribe has also reformed a law that regulated private security
firms. They have been converted in effect into auxiliaries of the army.
For example, all their arms – and there is a very large quantity of them, because
most of these people are retired army or police personnel, and they have
pretty much a franchise in the arms trade, with Panama particularly; there
are an estimated 160,000 of them in all – must be at the disposal
of the army, whenever it needs them. So must their computers and data
banks.
This is why I say that the core of these politics is the paramilitarization
of the country. What surprised me a little was that nearly all the major
national newspapers carried headlines to this effect. Even the traditional
political class has been taken aback. Paramilitarization has resulted in
a military, political and economic force which even the politicians cannot
control.
How are things now for the Justice and Peace Commission?
The Commission has seen a worrying development.
For 10 years I was its Co-ordinator, its legal representative, until I
had to leave the country in 1998 because of all the threats against my
life. From that moment on the hierarchy of the (Catholic) Church began
to apply pressure on us to abandon certain firm positions we had taken – for example, lay participation in the Commission.
As for our attitude to the military and the Government – the Commission
took an attitude of strong denunciation – we were told we couldn't
engage in this so strongly. The hierarchy applied more and more pressure,
demanding that we change some of our positions. This, unfortunately, divided
our assembly. Our older members chose to dissolve the Commission. But a new
Commission was created – smaller, with no official support, to continue
'accompanying' all the communities to which we are linked. This new Commission
has an ecumenical nature and is linked to other churches – Protestants
particularly, like the Presbyterians.
The military made use of this lack of support from the Church hierarchy to
invent all sorts of false accusations. There are currently three or four
legal cases pending against the Commission, all based on false evidence – a
common practice in Colombia today. The Commission now has almost no resources.
But there are volunteers who continue to accompany communities, especially
those that have been displaced and are returning to their homes, so they
can feel morally accompanied and are not displaced again.
You can find an earlier interview with Javier Giraldo in NI 303.
