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CRIME
| The revolutionary alternative

Disappearing desperados
Cuba does not have the same crime problems as the West. In stark
contrast to the
gangster-ridden days before the revolution, the streets
of Havana are now safe to walk.
Noll Scott explains why.
AFTER 100,000 Cuban malcontents left their native island aboard a flotilla of
Florida-based yachts and cruisers in the summer of 1980, President Fidel Castro compared
it with the exodus in the early years of the revolution. This time they didnt
get our doctors and technicians, he commented with satisfaction. This time
they got our scum.
By no means all the departing Cubans were criminals, but sure enough,
in the wake of this exodus, petty crime virtually disappeared from Havana as the black
market underworld collapsed. Host cities like Miami and New York, on the other hand, found
their crime rates soaring remarkably. More remarkable still was the sea-change that the
departing riff-raff themselves underwent in crossing the Florida Straits.
Pilferers and pickpockets became muggers and murderers overnight. Gangster feuds broke out
as the new arrivals began to penetrate the criminal fraternity. Instead of car parts,
dollars and stereos - coveted luxuries in Cuba - they started dealing in more
exotic merchandise such as cocaine and arms. Like a chameleon drawing its colour from its
surroundings, the Cubans rapidly explored the more spectacular possibilities on offer in
the US, land of opportunity. Washington, expecting boatloads of honest-to-goodness
dissidents, was appalled. The boatlift ended abruptly.
The bizarre chain of events gave outsiders a novel insight into some of
Cubas realities: the overwhelmingly political context within which the island lives
and breathes, the essentially petty nature of Cuban crime, and also the surprising number
of revolutionary misfits, criminal or otherwise.
Yet as the 1980 events illustrated, crime in Cuba is very different
from crime in rich countries like the US, or indeed most countries of the world. The most
visible criminal activity in Cuba as far as any Western visitor is concerned is its dollar
black-market. This is a reflection of widespread consumerist ambitions which
the revolution has not been able to eliminate. Foreigners are approached for dollars, paid
for at around five times the official rate. These are used to buy dollar-only goods
like fans and stereos at the hotel shops, which are sold at a profit for hundreds of
pesos, to be changed again for dollars, and so the cycle continues.
Yet there is an extraordinary absence of violent crime - visitors
rarely fail to be impressed by the climate of security. Woman or man, old or young, there
is an almost palpable feeling of safety in walking the streets late at night such as
exists in few other parts of the world. No tourist need expect much sympathy who leaves a
camera or wallet unattended; foreign women are the target of frequent unwelcome
compliments and hisses (in Latin America hissing is a way of attracting
attention, not a gesture of hostility) but they need not fear mugging or rape.
This peaceable social climate can be explained, first and foremost, by
the fact that basic needs for food, clothing, health and education are met, forestalling
the sheer desperation which is the central cause of endemic violent crime elsewhere in the
Third World. Who blames the poor Brazilian who breaks into the houses of the wealthy?
Cubans on the other hand can afford to despise violence for personal gain.
Second, the omnipresent Committees for the Defence of the Revolution,
originally mobilised to provide a vigil on each block against counter-revolutionary
saboteurs, have evolved into a permanent crime-watch of singular effectiveness. These
eyes and ears of the community - typically they are run by pensioners -
can justly claim the credit for the virtual elimination of street rape, for example. But
the principle of permanent vigilance - applied equally in workplaces, where workers
stand nightwatch on a rota basis - operates not only against suspicious outsiders.
Inveterate nosiness has also been elevated into a revolutionary principle. Be it because
of the climate which keeps doors and windows always wide open, or the still-cramped
housing conditions, nothing can pass unnoticed by friends, neighbours and relations.
Housing is far and away the major remaining social problem, above all
in the capital, but the paradoxical truth is that a policy of calculated neglect has
played its part in keeping down crime. Housing in the capital as a whole has been given a
low priority by the government, which has, instead, concentrated construction resources in
the countryside to build roads, dams and factories and to halt - at source - the
drift to the cities. That drift has plagued the rest of Latin America, giving rise to
huge, sprawling shanty towns around all the major urban centres which are inevitably
breeding grounds for crime. Havana over this period has doubled in size, to two million,
and accounts for - now as then - a fifth of the population, whereas Lima in
Peru, a comparable city in 1959, now holds half that countrys 14 million
inhabitants.
The law itself appears to have been a relatively minor influence over
the past quarter century, though sentences for crimes involving violence are long and
severe. Only in 1975 did the country acquire a new constitution to replace what was left
of the old Washington-style charter. And only in 1979 was the new Cuban Penal Code
established, similar in most respects to the legal system in the Soviet Union and other
Eastern European countries.
In the wake of the introduction of the penal code, the past five years
have seen considerable efforts on the part of the authorities to promote socialist
legality. But it is altogether too soon to talk about respect for the law in its own
right, and indeed while society is highly intolerant of those who commit acts of violence
there is very little stigma attached to the largest category of offenders, namely those
who divert social property for their own gain.
Even the official press is capable of reflecting this tolerance: an
article on the theft of cutlery from a restaurant some months ago (Why do we have to
eat our pizzas with a spoon? asked the headline) memorably drew the conclusion that
the thefts would continue as long as people were unable to buy knives and forks in the
shops.
The revolutions success in reducing crime to such trivial levels
is the more notable when we remember Havana was until relatively recently one of the
Meccas of the gangster world, capital of a country whose history is uniquely drenched in
blood and violence. Yet it can equally be said that the history of crime has made its
abolition a truly popular cause, central to the revolution.
Fidel Castro, a lawyer, defended himself against the charge of
attempting to overthrow the Batista dictatorship in 1953, closing his impassioned
denunciation of existing social conditions on the island with the famous words:
History will absolve me. His speech caught the popular imagination because it
offered a new definition of crime. Exploitation, disease and ignorance went on to become
the greatest crimes in Cuban demonology, to which other labels, at first strange -
such as imperialism, colonialism and capitalism - became attached. Serious crime and
politics became inextricably entangled. Warts and all, modern Cuba is the singular outcome
of that revolution against crime.
Noll Scott is a journalist who has lived and worked in Cuba since 1982.
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Ill-gotten gains
The white-collar crime that we know about is only the tip of an
iceberg. Australian
criminologist Peter Grabosky reports.
UNLIKE conventional Street crime, white-collar crime is the
work of people with high social status. It may be committed for individual gain, as in
personal income-tax evasion, the acceptance of a bribe or the fraudulent billing of health
insurance funds by doctors. Or it may be committed by agents of a company or government:
it may involve price fixing, deceptive advertising or environmental pollution. The costs
of white-collar crime are staggering. In 1984, one incident alone - the Bhopal gas
leak, caused the death of over 2,500 people and injured tens of thousands of others.
Fraudulent bankruptcies, where individuals acting alone or in managerial roles incur debts
which they have neither the hope nor the expectation of paying, cost creditors and
investors billions of dollars each year. And the marketing of outdated, ineffective,
unnecessary or otherwise hazardous drugs by pharmaceutical companies result in
considerable suffering, particularly in the vulnerable nations of the Third World.
Thousands of people die and hundreds of thousands more are injured in the workplace
each year as a result of breaches of safety regulations by employers. Consumers pay
billions more for products as a result of price fixing. The costs of crime by the
relatively privileged members of society far exceeds that of more conventional
crime. And the costs of white collar crime tend to be borne disproportionately by the less
privileged.
The line which separates criminal conduct from legally acceptable behaviour is often
obscure. The taxation laws of most Western societies are awesome in their complexity.
Accounting definitions and standards are notoriously flexible. A skilled taxpayer need not
resort to fraudulent conduct in order to avoid paying tax. And so it was that 40 US
corporations with combined profits of more than $10 thousand million in 1984 paid no
federal income tax for that year.
It has long been apparent in the Western world that the severity with which courts deal
with street criminals far exceeds the penalties imposed on white-collar
offenders. In September, for instance, Queensland company director Ian Beames was
sentenced to two years in jail for his part in a bottom of the harbour tax
scheme intended to defraud the Australian Government of $16.5 million in taxes.
Beames claimed to have received only $182,000 of a supposed fee of $640,000. The
maximum jail term Beames could have received is only three years. Commenting on the crime,
senior law lecturer Ari Friebers said: A person can break into a house and steal
perhaps $100 and be liable to a 14 year penalty but a person who takes $5 million can only
get a maximum of five years.
One of the greatest contributions to the control of white-collar crime can be made by
whistleblowers. But people who know about misconduct within an organisation may be
inhibited by a sense of loyalty to the company or agency from disclosing evidence of
corporate misconduct. Their reluctance may also stem from the fear of persecution.
Consider, for example, the case of Stanley Adams, imprisoned by the Swiss government
following his disclosures of price fixing and other restrictive trade practices by his
employer, Hoffman La Roche.
Crimes committed by the powerless have traditionally attracted a harsh response. But
the powerful, by contrast, have enjoyed the protection of legal loopholes, only the
symbolic enforcement of laws and penalties so mild as to be derisory. Whether these two
systems of justice will continue to co-exist in Australia or elsewhere is a matter which
will ultimately be resolved not just by the courts but also in the political arena.
Peter Grabosky is a senior criminoligist at the Australian Institute of Criminology,
Canberra.
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